Palestinian attacks continue against Israeli civilians Observers routinely point out that there is a “lull” in the Palestinian violence. Compared to the level of attacks against Israeli civilians of previous years, this is true. But there are still dozens of attacks and attempted attacks each week, including:-
It has also been acknowledged by Palestinian officials (and reported by an Israeli thinktank, the IDC in Herzliya) that a group called Jandallah, described as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda and with strong links in Pakistan and Afghanistan, is now active in Gaza.
Hamas is aiming to increase its control in Gaza following the Israeli pullout, capitalising on the perception on the Palestinian “street” that the Palestinian Authority is weak and corrupt. The political role of Hamas in the future remains unclear, but most analysts consider it will increase. Hamas is taking “credit” among Palestinians for “forcing” Israel to disengage, and is also poising itself for resumed violence. It has made no secret of the fact that its “halt” to the killing of Israelis is a tactical deception. For instance, in the words of Khaled Mashal, head of the political bureau of Hamas: “In the eyes of Hamas, tahdiah [calm] is a trick within the resistance plans… I cannot be satisfied with the 1967 borders alone….” [stated at a convention hosted in April by Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, and reported by Memri, Report No 894 – see www.memri.org)
The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, affiliated to Fatah, continues despatching suicide bombers. In recent months, it has made a concerted effort to recruit teenagers (see for example Briefing 143). Islamic Jihad rejects the very concept of a “lull” in violence, or a “ceasefire”. The 12 July suicide bombing in Netanya was by Islamic Jihad; and they have attempted massive suicide attacks against Israeli population centres in recent weeks (see Briefing 144). It is only the vigilance of Israel’s security forces that has prevented further carnage by Al Aqsa and Islamic Jihad.
The Palestinian Authority has repeatedly made clear that it will not disarm the Al Aqsa Martyrs or Islamic Jihad. The Al Aqsa Martyrs continually flout the Palestinian Authority, and intimidate its leaders (see Briefing 147). Islamic Jihad is attempting overtly to undermine the elected Palestinian leadership, and wreck Israeli-Palestinian relations. The attempts by the Palestinian Authority to integrate Palestinian security forces into one entity are failing, as well.
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas has restated his demand for
an unconditional right of return into Israel for Palestinian
refugees (see Beyond Images Briefing 142). This formula is guaranteed
to perpetuate long-term conflict, and fuel Palestinian violence
against Israel whatever the location of Israel’s withdrawal
lines. The international community, and many within Israel, repeatedly clamour for Israel to take “goodwill gestures” to enable Mahmoud Abbas to show his people that they have “something to gain” from his leadership, and from relations with Israel. In the first months of Abbas’s leadership, Israel took many such steps (see Briefing 134), and in June 2005 Israel carried out a substantial prisoner release. But these steps are being exploited by terrorist groups. An Israeli army spokesman has stated that the recent shooting dead of two Israeli teenagers near Hebron by Palestinian gunmen (see above) was the result of the relaxation of Israeli checkpoint controls in that area. And Israeli intelligence fears that the Palestinians may use any future road or rail link between post-disengagement Gaza and the West Bank as a conduit for hand-held missiles and other weaponry into the West Bank.
For many years Israel has complained bitterly about anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish incitement by Muslim clerics in Gaza and the West Bank. While the Palestinian Authority has declared that it wishes to curb this incitement (see Briefing 118), in reality it has continued. The speech on Friday 13 May by Gaza preacher Ibrahim Mdaires (see Memri Briefing 908 at www.memri.org) contained a litany of anti-semitic accusations and vilification (plus explicit threats to bomb Britain). He remains in his position: the Palestinian Authority refused to remove him.
It is not entirely surprising, against this background, that the outgoing Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon warned in an interview with Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz in June that Palestinian self-rule could “lead to war” in the future. He suggested that, following disengagement, violence against Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem would resume, and that there would be no stability. And he pointed out that the Palestinian ‘right of return’ implies that “there will not be a Jewish state”. Yaalon was criticised by some in Israel for being “defeatist” and motivated by “bitterness” following his premature departure from office. But others praised him for speaking about the “objective facts”, and their implications.
Instead, the Palestinian culture of violence and ideological extremism are unrelenting. For Israeli supporters of disengagement, this is a crushing disappointment. For Israeli opponents of disengagement, it confirms their fears. Observers continue to press Israel to disengage, and the Israeli government is committed to doing so. But those observers should also acknowledge that, disengagement is now an extremely and dangerous process for Israeli society.
Ariel Sharon, Disengagement and the Palestinians (Briefing
127, January 2005)
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